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Abstract 
Since 2002, 26 U.S. states have passed laws that enhance restrictions on voters who 
intend to register and vote.  Most have been sponsored by Republican legislators and 
passed by states with large Republican majorities. Proponents of such identification 
requirements argue they are necessary to ensure the integrity of the electoral system by 
reducing voter fraud. Many Democrats have cried foul, arguing these laws are motivated 
by crass partisanship at best, and racial bias at worst, because they disproportionately 
disenfranchise minorities. Surprisingly, empirical evidence for significant demobilization, 
either in the aggregate or among Democrats specifically, has thus far failed to 
materialize. We suspect strong emotional reactions to the public debate about these laws 
may mobilize Democrats, counterbalancing the disenfranchising effect. We find support 
for this conjecture in a nationally representative survey and an experiment where news 
frames about voter ID laws are carefully manipulated. 
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Introduction 
Over the last 2 decades, a large number of U.S. states have introduced restrictive 
voter identification (ID) laws. As of this writing, 32 states have voter identification laws 
of some kind on the books.
1
 Standard theories of participation would predict registration 
and voting restrictions increase the material costs of voting without increasing the 
benefit, and will therefore tend to reduce participation (Downs 1957). These general 
expectations have been borne out empirically in a variety of classic studies, with 
bureaucratic obstacles to voting and registration among the most reliable predictors of 
variation in participation across states and over time (Erikson 1981; Wolfinger, Highton, 
and Mullin 2005; Rosenstone and Hansen 1993; Oliver 1996; Nagler 1991; Highton, 
2004; Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980; Leighley and Nagler 1992). Concern about 
whether these new laws disproportionately demobilize particular groups of voters, 
therefore, is warranted. Surprisingly, empirical evidence of voter demobilization tied to 
identification laws has been elusive.  
We propose a fairly straightforward psychological explanation for the puzzling 
lack of evidence for demobilization in states with strict voter identification laws. A 
growing literature suggests that emotions play a powerful role in political information 
seeking and participation (Brader 2006; Marcus, Neuman and MacKuen 2000; Valentino, 
Hutchings, Banks, and Davis 2008; Valentino, Brader, Groenendyk, Gregorowicz, and 
Hutchings 2011). We suggest that popular media frames in the public debate about these 
laws make some voters very angry, and we suspect that anger is powerfully mobilizing. 
The laws target citizens who are perceived to be disadvantaged and Democratic: 
                                                        
1
 National Conference of State Legislatures. http://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-
campaigns/voter-id.aspx 
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especially poor and Black voters. This “disenfranchisement frame” therefore emphasizes  
the partisan motivations of these laws. The anger this frame triggers should thus 
disproportionately mobilize Democratic voters. In addition, we suspect the frame most 
often used to justify the laws- protecting the electoral system from the damaging effects 
of voter fraud- is likely to make Democrats angry as well, since it may be seen as just 
another rationalization for a frivolous and unnecessary solution to a problem that doesn’t 
exist. We posit that these strong reactions may have boosted Democratic turnout 
sufficient to compensate for the disenfranchising effect of the laws. Results from a 
nationally representative survey of U.S. opinion and an online experiment provide 
support for these expectations. 
 
Background  
Many worried that the door for new restrictions on registration and voting would 
open widely after the Supreme Court’s decision in June, 2013, to strike down a 
significant provision in the 1965 Voting Rights Act which forced certain jurisdictions 
with a history of racially biased election laws to gain prior federal approval for any 
changes in their voting statutes. Of course, voting and registration restrictions have deep 
roots, tied to the racial conflicts and partisan alignments of the post-civil war period 
through the progressive movement of the early 20
th
 century (McGerr 1988; Keyssar 
2008). For the conservative majority in a 5-4 decision on Shelby County v. Holder, Chief 
Justice Roberts argued that while the Section 5 “pre-clearance” provision for jurisdictions 
with a history of racial discrimination was not unconstitutional, the particular formula 
identifying such offending counties needed updating by Congress. Immediately after the 
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decision, several states- Texas, Florida, South Carolina and North Carolina- that had been 
covered by the “pre-clearance” provision announced plans for new voting restrictions. 
Many states uncovered by pre-clearance had already passed similar restrictions, and 
several others have passed them since.  
The partisan nature of these laws seems well established (Rocha and 
Matsubayashi 2014; Bentele and O’Brien 2013). Most have been sponsored by 
Republican legislators and passed by states with Republican governors (Biggers and 
Hanmer n.d). They are more common in states Republican legislative majorities (Rocha 
and Matsubayashi 2014). Their passage into law is tied to partisan competition at the 
state level: Competitive states controlled by Republican legislatures are particularly likely 
to pass these laws, presumably to protect their slim electoral margins (Bentele and 
O’Brien 2013; Hicks et al 2014). In addition, these studies fine racial demographic 
change matters: Republican states where the non-white electorate is growing rapidly are 
also much more likely to see these laws proposed and passed. Having said all this, the 
fact that Republican legislatures are most likely to pass these laws is not, on its own, 
enough to establish a motivation to demobilize Democratic voters and African Americans 
in particular. After all, the proponents of strict voter identification requirements argue 
they are necessary to reduce voter fraud, a problem few election observers have 
succeeded in documenting.  
Most theories of participation would predict these laws will demobilize voters, at 
least marginally. Weaver (2015) formalizes the expectation drawn from Downs (1957) 
that the impact of these laws on the costs to participation should outweigh any reasonably 
sized psychological benefits due to perceptions that the system is free of voter fraud.  In 
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addition, there is no evidence that concerns about vote fraud are very large, or that they 
vary systematically as a function of the stringency of the voter identification requirements 
at the state level (Ansolabehere and Persily 2008). Moreover, there appears to be no 
relationship between mass perceptions of the frequency of voter fraud and propensity to 
turn out (Ansolabehere 2009).  
Opponents have therefore argued these laws are simply intended to disenfranchise 
poorer and more transient voters, especially Blacks and other minorities. Civil rights 
leaders have rallied, loudly characterizing them as a Jim Crow style war on Black voter 
access to the ballot. For example, Moral Mondays, a grassroots movement in North 
Carolina, protests redistricting plans and voter identification restrictions. Organizers, 
many from southern Black churches and the NAACP, have staged demonstrations and 
acts of civil disobedience. The reach of this movement has spread to several other states 
including Florida, Alabama, Wisconsin, South Carolina, Georgia, and New York.
2
  
Scholars have pointed out several ways in which voter ID laws might plausibly 
discriminate against poor and non-white citizens (Hershey 2009; Sobel and Smith 2009). 
A North Carolina statute entitled the Voter Information and Verification Act (VIVA), 
passed in the immediate aftermath of the demise of Shelby, carries requirements that 
would plausibly affect Black citizens in the state disproportionately (Herron and Smith 
2014). These include the requirement of two forms of identification, which Blacks are 
significantly less likely to hold, and providing a special dispensation for voters older than 
70, who are disproportionately White. Barreto, Nuño and Sanchez (2009) found that 
Indiana’s voter identification statute posed a disproportionate burden, in both time and 
                                                        
2
 The New York Times, March 18, 2014. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/19/us/protest-
disrupts-georgia-senate-session-on-bill-to-block-medicaid-expansion.html 
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money, on the state’s low income, undereducated, and minority voters. They discovered 
significant racial differences in access to valid forms of identification.  
Some evidence also suggests these laws are applied differently to different voters, 
such that racial and ethnic minorities are more likely to be forced to comply. Cobb, 
Greiner and Quinn (2012) found that Black and Hispanic voters were more likely than 
whites to be asked to show proof of identification in a case study in Boston. Similar 
research in New Mexico showed that Hispanics were more likely to be asked to produce 
identification than non-Hispanics (Atkeson, Bryant, Hall, Saunders, and Alvarez 2010).  
Despite all these reasons for concern, evidence of demobilization as a result of 
voter identification laws has been scant. First, exit polls suggest almost no voters have 
experienced difficulties getting access to the ballot after being asked to produce 
identification. In addition, survey results in 2004 found no overall differences in self-
reported turnout between citizens in states with these laws compared to others, 
controlling for a host of demographics and other state-level characteristics (Vercellotti 
and Andersen 2009). Mycoff, Wagner and Wilson (2009) used individual-level data from 
the 2006 Cooperative Congressional Election Study (CCES) to examine whether state-
level ID requirements are negatively associated with turnout, but found no such effect. 
Pastor et al (2010), in a survey of registered voters in Indiana, Maryland, and Mississippi, 
found that only 1.2 per cent of registered voters lacked adequate identification, thereby 
suggesting these laws could not decrease turnout by very much. 
In addition, Alvarez, Bailey and Katz (2008) found no evidence in the aggregate 
that voter ID laws reduced turnout in both presidential and midterm elections from 2002 
to 2006, at least in the aggregate. At the individual level, they did find that very strict 
Page 7 of 55 Political Psychology
This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved.
A
cc
ep
te
d 
A
rt
ic
le
laws, such as presenting ID cards and matching signatures with those on file reduced 
turnout slightly, and did so more for the less educated and lower income citizens. 
However, the overall effects on turnout were surprisingly small. Erikson and Minnite 
(2009) also found little discernible negative impact of these laws, though they concluded 
that detecting such effects is statistically challenging due to the relatively small number 
of states with new restrictions in place. Finally, several recent Pew-sponsored Surveys on 
the Performance of American Elections (SPAE) suggest that nearly all voters in 2008, 
2012, and 2014 found the voting experience to be positive and were not discouraged by 
registration problems or issues at the polling place (Alvarez et al 2008; Stewart 2013, 
2015). 
In contrast, Hood and Bullock (2012), examining the effects of the 2007 Georgia 
Voter ID statute on turnout in 2008, found that those lacking appropriate identification 
were less likely to vote than those who were in possession of proper photo ID. However, 
they did not find any evidence that the law disproportionally affected ethnic or racial 
minorities. Finally, some work has detected a small increase in Democratic turnout in 
places with new voter ID laws (Milyo 2007).   
The possibility that strategic counter mobilization may have neutralized the 
negative impact of voter ID laws has received limited attention. A field experiment by 
Citrin, Green and Levy (2014) finds no evidence that announcements about voter ID 
requirements depress turnout. While their experiment returns no significant evidence of 
it, the authors speculate that information about ID laws may produce a backlash among 
those who view the measures as an attempt to disenfranchise specific groups. We are 
Page 8 of 55Political Psychology
This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved.
A
cc
ep
te
d 
A
rt
ic
le
interested in revisiting and more precisely testing the causal mechanisms underlying this 
backlash hypothesis. 
Theory and Hypotheses  
Our conjecture is that anger triggered by a discussion of voter ID laws can 
powerfully mobilize targeted groups. Democrats, in particular, may dismiss arguments 
about the need to reduce voter fraud and believe the laws are really just an unfair attempt 
by to disenfranchise their group.  These effects should be particularly strong among non-
White Democrats, because of the racialized nature of the debate. Unfortunately, samples 
available to us here do not contain enough non-White respondents to test our hypothesis 
for this group uniquely. If the psychological mechanism we posit is even stronger among 
African Americans, for example, then our results are conservative estimates of the 
counter mobilizing effect of these media frames in the country at large. 
To summarize, we suspect media frames describing these laws as partisan 
attempts to demobilize specific groups trigger anger in those groups, which then boosts 
participation. In addition, we already know that support for voter ID laws is strongest for 
Republicans, conservatives, and those high in racial resentment (Wilson and Brewer 
2013). The racialized nature of these laws seems to have registered with many citizens, 
and the more familiar Democrats and racial liberals are with this argument, the less they 
should support the law.  
If our conjecture is correct, it would help explain why aggregate levels of 
participation have not much changed in the aftermath of dozens of new voter ID laws 
passed in the last decade. Our hunch is that a simple, emotionally driven process is taking 
place. The laws have been framed in the news media as highly partisan and politically 
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divisive. We therefore would expect to observe a powerful linkage between partisan 
identification and both emotional reactions to these laws and general support for them. 
Policy threats may stimulate political activism by targeted groups (Miller and 
Krosnick 2004). In the domain of voter identification, some have speculated that these 
threats could lead to counter mobilization among Democrats (Hasen 2012). Still, the 
specific psychological mechanism operating is unspecified. We suspect that the group-
based nature of these attacks will most powerfully trigger anger among Democrats 
compared to Republicans. We would expect the opposite relationship between 
partisanship and anger about voter fraud: Republicans should be angered by the notion 
that ineligible voters are finding their way into the voting booth, and should thus be much 
more likely to support the laws compared to Democrats. As we have mentioned above, 
the media debate often invokes a racial dimension. If so, we would also expect racial 
attitudes to be strongly linked to emotional reactions to these laws, and to overall support 
for them.  
The literature on the political consequences of specific emotions has grown 
rapidly in recent decades, beginning with Marcus et al’s work on Affective Intelligence 
(2000). Their central idea was that negative emotions break people out of cognitive 
routines, prompting them to think more carefully about new information and readying 
them to act. Subsequent experimental work confirmed and expanded upon these 
expectations (Brader 2006). Appraisal theories of emotion (e.g. Lazarus 1991) argue that 
we may see distinct behavioral consequences of specific negative emotions. Anger, it is 
posited, increases the willingness to take risks and expend scarce resources in order to 
address threats that are perceived to be under one’s control (Lerner and Keltner 2001; 
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Huddy, Feldman, and Cassese 2007). Finally, Intergroup Emotions Theory (Leonard et 
al. 2011) also predicts that group-based threats are particularly emotionally potent, and 
lead to anger even when an individual does not feel personally targeted. Recent work 
confirms these findings in the political domain, discovering threats to group identity can 
powerfully trigger anger (Groenendyk and Banks 2014), and anger can powerfully 
mobilize participation (Valentino et al. 2011).  
If we are correct, then, Democrats exposed to either side of the elite debate about 
voter ID should also be the most angry, because both the demobilization and voter fraud 
frames remind them their group is under attack. Claibourn and Martin (2012) suggest that 
symbolic issues can lead to backlash and counter mobilization among targeted groups. 
They find, for example, that appeals to morality (e.g. on gay rights) aimed to mobilize 
evangelicals boosted participation among gay rights groups even more powerfully. At the 
same time, we would predict that only exposure to the voter fraud frame should lead to 
anger among Republicans. This partisan distinction in emotional reactions emerges 
because the disenfranchisement frame has been highly salient in the news, and constitutes 
a direct attack on Democratic identity, while the voter fraud claim has been both less 
salient and is not a direct attack on Republicans as a group. 
Next, we predict those most angered by the debate should be more likely to 
participate. This should be true even after controlling for factors that cause both anger 
and participation, such as socioeconomic status, news consumption, and the strength of 
partisan identification. We again suspect that anger about both sides of the debate may be 
mobilizing for Democrats, while only anger about fraud should powerfully mobilize 
Republicans. Our reasons for expecting such a partisan distinction are straightforward. 
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Among Democrats, political messages highlighting the laws’ specific goal to 
disenfranchise co-partisans should boost participation. Those messages may not mobilize 
Republicans, because their group is not portrayed as a direct target of these laws by either 
frame. Messages about voter fraud, for the reasons discussed above, might mobilize both 
Democrats and Republicans. The net effect of the entire debate, then, is a larger 
mobilizing effect among Democrats. 
To examine the causal impact of these frames on emotional reactions and 
participation, we combine our cross sectional survey evidence with an experiment. We 
expect exposure to either side of the debate about voter ID legislation to trigger powerful 
anger in many citizens on both sides of the aisle. Democrats, however, are expected to 
react most strongly in response to the debate, as a result of the logic we detailed above. 
Disenfranchisement frames should be most powerful, especially when they emphasize the 
racialized nature of these laws. We would expect Republicans and Independents to have 
more muted emotional reactions to this debate. 
Finally, our theory suggests that messages about these laws will powerfully boost 
participation specifically via the anger they trigger. Anger, in other words, should 
mediate the relationship between exposure to these messages and participation in politics. 
This effect should be especially large among Democrats because they perceive their 
group to be under attack.  
 
Study 1: Voter ID Survey 
Sample and Methods 
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We test our hypotheses in two original studies. First, we fielded an online survey 
with GfK (formerly Knowledge Networks) in February 2014. This sample consisted only 
of white, non-Hispanic Americans and there were a total of 750 respondents. Focusing on 
white respondents makes for a conservative approach, given that we would expect anger 
reactions among African Americans to be even stronger given that they are targeted both 
for their race and their party. Still, we would welcome future studies that tested these 
hypotheses among Blacks and other minorities. The key variables are measures of anger 
related to voter ID laws as well as fraud, and measures of participation.  
Respondents’ anger toward voter identification laws and voter fraud are measured 
using two specific questions. First, respondents were asked how angry it would make 
them feel if voter identification laws actually prevented some eligible voters from casting 
a ballot. Second, respondents were asked how angry it would make them feel if someone 
who was ineligible to vote nonetheless attempted to cast a ballot. In both cases response 
options ranged from “not at all angry” to “extremely angry” on a five-point scale. The 
first variable captures anger about voter identification laws while the second captures 
anger about voter fraud. We also measure racial resentment using the standard four items 
that compose a reliable scale (Henry and Sears 2002, Kinder and Sanders 1996). This 
also serves as an important control to isolate the impact of anger. All variables in these 
models were recoded to run from zero to one with higher values indicating higher levels 
of anger. Question wordings are contained in the Online Appendix. 
The first study relies on two participation measures that we combine into a scale. 
First, respondents were asked how likely they would be to volunteer time to raise 
awareness about voter ID laws in order to help voters satisfy the new requirements. 
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Second, respondents were asked how likely it was that they would vote in the 2014 
midterm election. In both cases response options ranged from “not at all likely” to 
“extremely likely” on a five-point scale. We combined these two questions into a 9-point 
scale. Models run separately on each question return very similar results. Throughout the 
analyses we use the continuous seven-point party identification variable with higher 
values meaning more Democratic. 
Results 
 First we find that both arguments in the popular debate seem to enrage 
Democrats: They are angry both at the laws themselves and at claims made by 
Republicans that they are necessary in order to eliminate voter fraud. Strong Democrats 
score .73 out of 1 on anger about these laws, where 1 corresponds to feeling “extremely” 
angry about voter disenfranchisement and 0 would mean the respondent experienced that 
emotion not at all. Strong Republicans score only .37 on this scale. The midpoint of this 
scale represents a respondent who felt these emotions only somewhat. Strong 
Republicans score .77 out of 1 on anger about voter fraud, while strong Democrats score 
.59, which is above the midpoint. As expected, support for the laws is strongly 
conditioned by partisanship. The mean level of opposition for these laws is .69 among 
strong Democrats on the 0-1 scale (running from strongly favor at 0 to strongly oppose at 
1, with neither favor nor oppose at .5) but only .11 among strong Republicans. 
Next we examine predictors of emotions toward, and general support for, voter 
identification laws in the multivariate context to see whether partisanship is standing in 
for some other demographic or attitudinal difference. In particular, we suspect that racial 
attitudes could powerfully influence attitudes about these laws. Education, strength of 
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partisanship, and attention to news might also trigger strong emotional reactions to this 
debate. We also control for age and gender, due to demographic imbalances in 
partisanship that might explain at least some of the opinion variation we have discussed. 
Our expectation remains that partisanship will be linked to opinions about these laws, 
above and beyond these other factors. Table 1 displays results from three linear 
regression models consistent with these expectations.  
[Table 1 about here] 
 As we expected, partisanship among American whites remains a strong predictor 
of anger about both voter ID laws and about voter fraud, but in opposite directions. 
Democrats are much more angry than Republicans about the laws themselves, as seen in 
the first column of the first row. Strong Democrats are .2 points higher than strong 
Republicans on the 0-1 anger scale. The relationship between partisanship and anger 
about voter fraud, in the second column, suggests smaller partisan differences. The 
coefficient is about half the size as for anger about the laws themselves, but with 
Republicans slightly more angry than Democrats.  This difference is another indication 
that anger about the entire voter identification debate might be more potent among 
Democrats than it is for Republicans.  
Our results confirm that symbolic racism (SR) is a powerful predictor of whites’ 
anger about these laws. Those at the highest levels of SR score more than .4 points lower 
on the 0-1 scale for anger about these laws compared to those lowest in SR. Anger about 
voter fraud is somewhat less powerfully linked to SR. In fact, SR contributes more than 
any other variable in the model. However, even after controlling for its impact, party 
identification still strongly predicts anger reactions to these news frames. Ours, therefore, 
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is not just a story about race, but also about the anger that can be generated by what are 
perceived to be strictly partisan attacks. 
If our theory is correct, we would also expect Democrats who are most exposed to 
the debate to be the most angry, because either frame is likely to remind Democrats that 
their group is being directly attacked. We predict milder affective reactions among 
Republicans regardless of exposure to the debate, both because the voter fraud frame has 
been relatively weak and because neither side presents Republicans as a direct target of 
discrimination. While we do not have precise measures of exposure to these frames, we 
assume that those highest in general news exposure in general will be more likely to see 
them. This prediction is consistent with Zaller (1992), who theorized that highly aware 
partisans would be polarized first and most strongly by messages like the ones we are 
discussing. Figure 1 presents a plot drawn from the model presented in the first columns 
of Appendix Table 1A. Here we add an interaction between partisanship and general 
news exposure to the model presented in Table 1 above. The results are clearly in line 
with our expectations: As general news exposure increases among Democrats, so does 
anger about these laws. News awareness has little effect on Republican anger about these 
laws. Appendix Table 1A also replicates the same interactive model for anger about voter 
fraud. Exposure to news is more weakly associated with anger about fraud among 
Republicans than it is with anger about ID laws among Democrats. Further, there is no 
statistically significant interaction between party identification and news consumption. 
Both highly exposed Democrats and Republicans are angrier about voter fraud than those 
who consumed less news.  
[Figure 1 about here] 
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We also expected to find a strong link between anger about these laws and 
intentions to participate. If our theory is correct, people angry about either side of the 
debate- the laws themselves or the voter fraud they are intended to eliminate- should also 
be more willing to participate in various ways. Our participation measures in the survey 
involved turning out to vote and volunteering to inform people about the new rules and 
requirements. Table 2 displays the results of multivariate OLS models that estimate the 
impact of anger about ID laws and voter fraud on the participation scale, controlling for 
several important causal antecedents of participation. 
[Table 2 about here] 
 In the first column of Table 2 we see that both anger about ID laws and anger 
about voter fraud both strongly predict participation, even after controlling for several 
important factors that could account for the relationship. Those most angry about the laws 
were nearly .15 points (p<.01, two tailed) more likely to participate on the 0-1 scale than 
those who were the least angry. The association between anger about voter fraud and 
participation was over twice as large, at .32 points (p<.001, two tailed). The link between 
anger about this debate and participation is not an artifact of partisan strength, 
socioeconomic status, news consumption, gender or age.  
In the second column of Table 2, we include interactions between partisanship 
and both anger at voter ID laws and at voter fraud in the 3rd and 5
th
 rows, respectively. 
The interaction in row 3 suggests that anger about ID laws is far more powerfully linked 
to participation among Democrats than it is among Republicans, just as we predicted. The 
second row of the interactive model indicates the impact of anger about these laws is very 
nearly zero among strong Republicans, who are coded “0” on the PID scale. The 
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association is nearly .3 points for strong Democrats. Figure 2 displays the interaction of 
interest. We found a very substantial difference between strong Democrats and strong 
Republicans in the impact of anger on intentions to participate. Strong Democrats low in 
anger about these laws are significantly less likely than strong Republicans to vote or 
volunteer to help other citizens overcome the obstacles to voting these laws put in place. 
Those very high in anger, however, are significantly more likely to do so.  
[Figure 2 about here] 
On the other hand, anger about voter fraud is mobilizing among Republicans, as 
seen by the coefficient in row 4 of Table 2. The mobilizing effect of anger about fraud is 
smaller for Democrats, as is demonstrated by the negative interaction coefficient in row 
5. Figure 3 displays the interaction between partisanship and anger about voter fraud 
drawn from the model in Table 2. Here we see that the impact of anger about fraud on 
participation is positive for both Democrats and Republicans, as predicted. Both sides of 
the debate anger Democrats, and that anger seems to be mobilizing, while only one 
argument is effective in this same way for Republicans. Again these relationships hold in 
the presence of a broad set of controls.  
[Figure 3 about here] 
Study 2: Survey Experiment 
The results from Study 1 provide observational evidence consistent with our 
expectations. However, these correlations cannot allow us to rule out causal explanations 
other than the one we believe is operating. For example, perhaps citizens most likely to 
participate are also most likely to say they are angry about a host of issues in order to 
rationalize their behavior. Our central hypothesis is that exposure to common media 
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frames about this debate triggers disproportionately high levels of anger among 
Democrats, and that this anger is also more powerfully mobilizing than it is among 
Republicans. Study 2 employs a simple experimental manipulation to test the causal 
mechanisms underlying our core hypotheses.  
 
Sample 
We conducted an online survey experiment in June 2014, for which respondents 
where recruited on Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk). Samples recruited through 
MTurk are demographically diverse, if not statistically representative of the general U.S. 
population, especially compared to commonly used convenience samples (Berinsky, 
Huber and Lenz 2012). We collected a total of 750 interviews. The sample was restricted 
to U.S. citizens, yielding a demographic breakdown that was 79% White, 41% Democrat, 
44% Female, with a mean age of 33 years.  
 
Experimental Design and Treatments 
The survey experiment randomly assigned respondents to one of five news 
conditions focusing on the role of voter identification laws during the 2014 midterm 
election, and all these are available in the Online Appendix. Our intention was to mimic 
the actual debate about the motivations behind voter ID laws. We created several 
fictitious news articles that carefully manipulated cues about these laws, highlighting 
either the problem they were intended to solve or their potentially demobilizing effects 
among Democrats or African Americans in particular.  
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Respondents in a control condition read an article about the upcoming midterm 
election that highlighted the importance of campaign finance and voter turnout. This 
article provides a baseline argument that heightens awareness of the upcoming election 
and primes the importance of participation and campaign spending, but does not mention 
voter ID laws or their consequences in any way. This design choice is intentional and 
conservative: Respondents in the control group receive information about the election, 
and even some potentially emotion-inducing material about campaign fundraising by 
candidates on both sides of the aisle. Had our control subjects read no article whatsoever, 
or one that was not about the election, one might be concerned that our effects were not 
driven by the discussion of voter ID laws per se, but were simply a result of exposure to 
political information or increased salience of the election in general. We chose to mention 
campaign fundraising intentionally because it is an issue about which partisans on both 
sides of the aisle seem to agree. A recent CBS/New York Times poll found that more 
than three quarters of Americans are concerned about the unfair influence of money in 
politics, would like to increase public disclosure of contributions, and oppose the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Citizens United v. FEC (2010).
3
 This helps ensure that 
differences in reaction to our experimental manipulation highlighting the demobilizing 
impact of voter ID laws are not due to divergent partisan reactions to the baseline 
information in these stories. 
Three additional news conditions discuss voter ID laws and disenfranchisement 
with increasing intensity and specificity. These treatments were intended to achieve a 
“volume” manipulation for the salience of the demobilization argument that has become 
                                                        
3
 http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/03/us/politics/poll-shows-americans-favor-overhaul-
of-campaign-financing.html 
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the centerpiece of opposition to these laws. We believe our design allows us to 
conservatively estimate the independent effect of the debate about voter ID laws on 
participation. 
The first treatment, the “ID laws” condition, uses the same basic text as the 
control but suggests that turnout and voter ID laws will matter. The article simply states 
that new voting rules are in place, and that voters will need to follow them in order to 
successfully vote. There is no discussion of potential consequences of the laws, nor is 
there any mention of the fact that they ostensibly necessary to reduce voter fraud. The 
second treatment condition introduces the basic “disenfranchisement” argument, 
suggesting that voter ID laws might prevent some eligible voters from casting a ballot. 
The “loudest” version of the argument, the “ Black disenfranchisement” condition, adds 
to the basic disenfranchisement frame the claim that legal African American voters will 
be hit hardest by these laws. This final treatment is, to our mind, both the loudest and 
clearest representation of the disenfranchisement frame in the media environment at the 
moment, and therefore could serve to be the most powerful trigger of mobilizing 
emotions like anger among Democrats.  An additional story condition presents 
respondents with the standard “voter fraud” argument, suggesting that these laws help 
prevent illegal votes from being cast. This treatment thus justifies the existence of voter 
ID laws by claiming that the laws help prevent voter fraud. If our theory is correct, this 
condition should trigger anger among both Democrats and Republicans, but more weakly 
than the quintessential disenfranchisement frame does.
4
  
                                                        
4 A manipulation check was performed at the very end of the survey, asking each 
respondent to select from a list of topics the one that best described the news story they 
read. More than 90% of respondents in each condition correctly identified the topic. 
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Measures 
After reading the stimulus article, respondents answered a set of questions tapping anger 
reactions and intentions to participate. Subjects were asked how strongly the story they 
read made them feel a list of positive and negative emotions. To measure anger reactions 
in this experiment, we combine responses for angry, outraged, disgusted, and annoyed 
into a measure of total anger which was recoded to run from 0-1. These items represent a 
highly reliable scale (Cronbach’s alpha= 0.93).
5
 Further, It is worth noting that this 
measure differs from the one employed in the first study as the question does not ask 
whether voter ID laws or voter fraud cause anger, but instead merely asks how the story 
made them feel. We used this measurement strategy intentionally, because stories about 
voter fraud could trigger anger among Democrats not because they believe voter fraud is 
a problem but because they believe the voter fraud argument is simply a crass partisan 
excuse for disenfranchising their group. 
Our dependent variable is an additive index of five binary indicators of intention 
to participate, including voting turnout, attending political events, donating to a 
candidate, the amount the respondent is willing to donate, and volunteering to raise 
awareness of voter identification laws. Turnout was measured using the new American 
National Election Study turnout item that attempts minimize social desirability concerns 
by providing respondents with ample excuses for why they may not be able to vote. 
Attending political events was measured by asking respondents how likely they were to 
attend political meetings, rallies, speeches, dinners, or other activities in support of a 
                                                        
5
 All question wordings are listed in the Online Appendix. We performed these analyses 
for each anger item separately and the results were substantively equivalent. 
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particular candidate. Donating to candidates and parties was assessed by, first, asking 
respondents how likely they were to donate to a candidate and, second, to ask what the 
maximum dollar amount they would donate would be. The volunteering question is the 
same as the one used in Study 1. For each component of the index respondents were 
coded as one if they were extremely likely or very likely to partake in that activity and 
zero otherwise. For amount of dollars donated respondents were coded one if the amount 
was a dollar or above and zero otherwise. This produces a 5-point additive index of 
participation, which we recoded to run from 0-1. 
 
Results 
We first examine the effect of our news stories on anger among all respondents. 
The results in Figure 4 support our basic expectation about the emotional reaction to this 
debate. While total anger about voter ID laws is quite low (0.16) in the control condition, 
it increases markedly and consistently in the three voter ID story conditions, from 0.24 in 
the basic voter ID condition, to .31 in the disenfranchisement condition, and finally to 
0.41 in the Black disenfranchisement condition. Our respondents also reported 
significantly more anger in the fraud condition (0.29) compared to the control, but the 
effect was smaller than all but the most basic voter ID story which does not mention the 
laws’ demobilizing potential.  
[Figure 4 about here] 
Figure 5 breaks these results out by party identification. Once again consistent 
with our expectations, the impact of these frames is most pronounced for those who 
identify as Democrats. Democratic respondents report very low anger in the control 
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condition (0.15), while their anger rises to .26 in the basic ID frame, to .42 in the 
disenfranchisement frame, and to 0.48 in the Black disenfranchisement condition. For 
Democrats, the volume manipulation worked exactly as intended: Increasing the volume 
of the demobilization message led to significant increases in anger in every step in Figure 
5 (p<0.01) except for the difference between the disenfranchisement frame and the black 
disenfranchisement frame. For Republicans, none of these differences between sequential 
conditions were significant. Therefore, the voter ID and disenfranchisement frames were 
a weaker trigger for anger among Republicans and Independents, as expected. Democrats 
expressed significantly more anger than non-Democrats in the disenfranchisement and 
black disenfranchisement frames. Finally, in the Voter fraud condition we found that 
Democrats (.33) were even more angered than Republicans (.25) and Independents (.24), 
though these differences were not statistically significant. These results line up quite 
nicely with our expectations: The disenfranchisement frame, especially when it describes 
the impact on African American voters, triggers powerful anger among the Democrats in 
our sample. Voter fraud also triggers anger among Democrats, but the partisan 
distinctions in reactions to this frame are smaller. Next we move to a full test of the 
causal chain we believe may be at work here: Anger triggered by these frames should 
mobilize participation primarily among Democrats. 
[Figure 5 about here] 
 We modeled the impact of anger as a mediator of the effect of exposure to media 
frames about voter ID on political participation using Imai, Keele, and Yamamoto’s  
(2010) mediation software which provides us with average causal mediation effects 
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(ACME) allowing us to examine whether the effect of the treatment is mediated by 
anger.
6
 The results of these tests are presented in Figures 6-8.  
 We first estimate the mediating impact of anger for all respondents exposed to 
either of the most salient frames in the debate- the black disenfranchisement and the voter 
fraud conditions. Our expectation was that the total effect of exposure to these frames 
would be mobilizing for all respondents, and that is the case as is shown by the total 
effect described at the top of Figure 6 (B=.05, p<.05, two-tailed). The bottom half of the 
figure then displays the direct and indirect pathways by which exposure influences 
participation. Exposure to these frames very significantly increases anger among all 
respondents (B=.19, p<.001), as we have shown before, and that anger is powerfully 
mobilizing (B=.13, p<.001). Once anger is included in the model, the direct effect of 
exposure is reduced by about half and is no longer statistically significant (B=.023, 
p=.27). This produces a highly significant ACME coefficient (.03, p<.05), and anger 
appears to explain about 51% of the total effect of the frame on participation.  
[Figure 6 about here] 
 We also expected that the Black disenfranchisement frame would be especially 
mobilizing for Democrats via the anger it triggers. Figure 7 breaks down the effect of that 
frame compared to the control condition for Democrats versus all other partisans. The left 
side of the figure shows a significant total effect of exposure to the Black 
disenfranchisement condition on turnout among Democratic respondents (B=.08, p<.05). 
In the bottom left of Figure 7 we see that 44% of the impact of this frame on participation 
                                                        
6
 The key benefit of this approach is its ability to non-parametrically estimate effects. 
However, because both the mediator and outcome regressions are linear, this approach 
gives equivalent results to the standard product of coefficients approach.   
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is mediated by anger. On the right hand side of the figure, we see that there is no 
significant positive effect of exposure to the Black disenfranchisement frame on 
participation, and therefore there is no relationship to be mediated. We are confident, 
then, that this pattern of results is consistent with our expectation that anger mediates the 
impact of this frame for Democrats but not other partisans. 
[Figure 7 about here] 
 Next we modeled the indirect effect of exposure to the voter fraud frame via anger 
for Republicans (the target audience) versus all others.  Here we expected there would be 
no effect among Republicans, but that this frame might actually boost turnout among 
other partisans, and Figure 8 displays a pattern consistent with that expectation. On the 
left, we see that the fraud frame does not significantly boost turnout among Republicans 
in our sample, and again there is no mediation via anger. On the right hand of the figure, 
however, there is a significant effect of the fraud frame on participation among non-
Republicans, and 32% of that relationship is mediated by anger, as is demonstrated by the 
ACME coefficient. 
[Figure 8 about here] 
Alternative Mechanisms 
We have claimed that anger triggered by these frames is the important causal 
mechanism underlying their effect on participation. It is important, therefore, for us to 
explore and rule other potential mediators of the effect. One is that these frames simply 
change people’s beliefs about the incidence of voter fraud, by convincing them the laws 
will reduce illegal ballots, and this boosts turnout. We asked people in the post-test how 
big a problem they believed voter fraud to be but found no direct effect of either the 
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disenfranchisement or the voter fraud treatments on answers to this question. Therefore 
the perceived importance of the problem does not mediate the impact of the frames on 
intention to participate. 
Another alternative is that these frames mobilize voters not by triggering anger 
but simply because they polarize opinions about the laws.  Such an effect would not be 
causally incompatible with our explanation, but we would argue that attitude polarization 
is not necessary here. The emotional reaction to the partisan threat implicit in these laws 
should be sufficient to mobilize voters, especially Democrats, without fundamentally 
changing their support for the laws themselves. We asked respondents in the post-test to 
indicate how strongly they favored or opposed “laws requiring identification for an 
individual to obtain a ballot, even if such a law made it difficult for some eligible citizens 
to cast a ballot?” Exposure to any of these frames neither significantly changed mean 
support for the laws, nor did they polarize partisans into more extreme positions. The 
mobilizing effect of these frames is not therefore carried by any increase in strong 
opposition or support for the laws themselves. 
A third alternative might be that any emotional arousal, not specifically anger, 
might produce results like the ones we display in these meditational analyses. If so, any 
emotional reaction should mediate the relationship between exposure and participation. 
We measured positive emotional reactions, such as hope, to the story in order to test 
whether any emotional arousal mediated the relationship between exposure and 
participation. We find first that, as with anger, hopefulness in general is positively related 
to participation. However, exposure to the black disenfranchisement or voter fraud 
frames marginally reduces hope, and therefore should reduce participation overall. Hope, 
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therefore, cannot explain why the frames are associated with an increase in participation 
in our sample. Results for this and the other mediators are available in the Online 
Appendix. The general pattern, we believe, suggests the mobilizing effect of these frames 
is primarily the result of the anger they trigger, not fundamental changes in perceptions of 
the size of the problem of voter fraud or other emotional reactions. 
 
Conclusion 
 We have proposed an explanation for the surprising null impact on turnout, to 
date, of voter ID laws that have swept the country in the last 15 years. We find evidence 
for of a political psychological explanation that implicates powerful emotional reactions 
in response to the dominant frames in the media environment regarding these laws. 
 Democrats seem especially reactive to the disenfranchisement frame or the voter 
fraud frames, presumably because either one reminds them of the argument that these 
laws are a partisan motivated attack on their group. We found that Democrats and 
Republicans reacted very differently to the dominant frames in the public discourse, with 
Republicans angry only about fraud, but Democrats angry about both frames. This anger 
was not simply a result of interest in the campaign or socioeconomic factors. 
Furthermore, anger about these laws linked strongly to news consumption among 
Democrats but not Republicans. On the other hand, news consumption enhanced anger 
about voter fraud more weakly among Republicans, and that linkage was statistically 
indistinguishable for Democrats. This anger that Democrats experienced about voter ID 
was also powerfully linked to participation among Democrats but not Republicans. Anger 
about fraud, on the other hand, was positively associated with participation among all 
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partisans. Future work might further explore other moderators of these types of emotional 
mechanisms that could influence participation. Obvious candidates would be race and 
age, with younger voters perhaps mobilized into politics with these arguments for the first 
time.  
These observational relationships were in line with our theoretical expectations, 
but we ran an experiment to more fully investigate the causal mechanisms of interest. We 
found that exposure to increasingly specific voter disenfranchisement frames triggered 
anger powerfully among all respondents, but especially among Democrats. The emotional 
effect of the voter fraud frame was weaker, and still stronger among Democrats than 
either Republicans or Independents. Finally, this anger significantly mediated the impact 
of exposure on participation for Democrats but not Republicans. 
In sum, then, we have uncovered one possible explanation for the unexpected null 
findings in previous aggregate analyses of the impact of these voter ID laws. However, 
we do not think these findings should provide much comfort to those concerned about the 
impact of Shelby and or the new voting and registration restrictions popping up all over 
the country. The counter mobilization via these frames among Democrats that may be 
triggered by the debate may be short lived. In the long run, these restrictions would be 
expected to have their intended effect: demobilizing lower SES, non-white, and therefore 
predominantly Democratic voters. Perhaps the emotionally fueled counter mobilization 
we have uncovered would dissipate over time. Given the power of habit in political 
participation (Plutzer 2002; Green and Shachar 2000), we suspect in fact that these 
emotional effects might have their largest mobilizing effects among younger, marginal 
voters. At the same time, these efforts might well establish stronger voting habits among 
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young people that could offset the effect of voter ID laws, as is suggested by work 
demonstrating the powerful role of emotion in the establishment of participatory habits in 
the first place (Valentino et al. 2009). While only time will tell, we suspect the mobilizing 
frames used in get out the vote campaigns in 2012 and 2014 may continue to resonate for 
some time. Future research might explore the frequency and potency of these emotional 
appeals on turnout in coming election cycles. 
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Table 1. Predictors of Anger about Voter ID Laws, Anger about Voter Fraud, and 
General Opposition to ID Laws 
 
 
Anger about Voter 
ID Laws 
Anger about Voter 
Fraud 
Opposition to 
Voter ID Laws 
    
Party ID (Hi=Dem) 0.20
***
 -0.12
***
 0.36
***
 
 (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) 
    
Symbolic Racism -0.42
***
 0.28
***
 -0.57
***
 
 (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) 
    
Party ID Strength 0.05 0.07
*
 -0.00 
 (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) 
    
Education 0.07 0.07 0.05 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
    
Income 0.05 -0.03 0.02 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
    
News Consumption 0.05 0.10
***
 0.07
*
 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
    
Female 0.02 0.01 -0.00 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
    
Age 0.03 0.11
**
 -0.06 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
    
Constant 0.50
***
 0.36
***
 0.49
***
 
 (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) 
N 616 615 701 
adj. R
2
 0.28 0.20 0.49 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*
 p < 0.05, 
**
 p < 0.01, 
***
 p < 0.001 (by two-tailed test). 
Data: Data are from Voter ID Survey, Knowledge Networks. All variables are coded 0-1. 
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Figure 1.  
 
Note: The results are drawn from Table 1A in the appendix based on all partisans, but 
here we show only the strongest partisans for the sake of clarity. The slope of the effect 
of news consumption changes incrementally as we move from one end to the other on the 
party identification scale. 
 
 
 
 
  
Page 38 of 55Political Psychology
This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved.
A
cc
ep
te
d 
A
rt
ic
le
Table 2. The Impact of Anger about Voter ID Laws and Voter Fraud on Participation 
 Participation Likelihood Participation Likelihood 
   
Party Identification 0.01 0.08 
 (0.03) (0.08) 
   
Anger about ID Laws 0.15
***
 0.01 
 (0.03) (0.05) 
   
Anger about ID Laws X 
Party Identification 
 0.27
***
 
  (0.08) 
   
Anger about Voter Fraud 0.32
***
 0.49
***
 
 (0.03) (0.06) 
   
Anger about Voter Fraud X 
Party Identification 
 -0.32
***
 
  (0.09) 
   
Party ID Strength  0.08
**
 0.04 
 (0.03) (0.03) 
   
Education 0.10
***
 0.09
**
 
 (0.03) (0.03) 
   
Income 0.02 0.00 
 (0.04) (0.04) 
   
News Consumption 0.10
***
 0.09
***
 
 (0.02) (0.02) 
   
Female -0.00 0.01 
 (0.02) (0.02) 
   
Age 0.15
***
 0.15
***
 
 (0.03) (0.03) 
   
Constant 0.04 0.02 
 (0.04) (0.06) 
N 612 612 
adj. R
2
 0.35 0.37 
Standard errors in parentheses   * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
Data: Data are from Voter ID Survey, Knowledge Networks. 
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Figure 2. Relationship Between Anger about ID Laws and Participation Likelihood, by 
PID  
 
The figure is based on the results from the model in the second column of Table 2, above, 
with controls for strength of partisanship, education, income, age, gender, media 
consumption. The lines depict results for strong Republicans versus Strong Democrats (1 
and 7 on the 7-point party ID scale) with 95% confidence intervals.  
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Figure 3. Relationship between Anger about Fraud and Participation Likelihood, by PID 
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Figure 4. Anger and News Framing of Voter ID Laws  
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Figure 5. News Frames and Anger about Voter ID Laws, by Partisanship 
 
Note: Here we combine “strong” and “weak” Democrats, “strong” and “weak” 
Republicans, and all others as Independent. Within both the Voter Disenfranchisement 
condition and the Black Disenfranchisement condition we find statistically significant 
differences between Democrats and all others combined (p<.05, two tailed).  
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Figure 6. The Mediating Effect of Anger on Participation in Reaction to Black 
Disenfranchisement and Voter Fraud Frames. 
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Figure 7. The Anger-Mediated Impact of the Black Disenfranchisement Frame, by 
Partisanship 
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Figure 8. The Impact of the Vote Fraud Frame, mediated by anger, among Republicans 
versus other partisans 
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Online Appendix  
 
Table A1. News Consumption X Party Identification on Anger about ID laws and 
voter fraud 
 
 Anger about ID Laws Anger about Voter Fraud 
   
News Consumption -0.07 0.13
**
 
 (0.05) (0.04) 
   
Party Identification 0.10 -0.09 
 (0.05) (0.04) 
   
News Consumption X Party 
Identification 
0.24
**
 -0.06 
 (0.08) (0.07) 
   
Income 0.05 -0.03 
 (0.05) (0.05) 
   
Education 0.07 0.07 
 (0.04) (0.04) 
   
Symbolic Racism -0.41
***
 0.28
***
 
 (0.05) (0.04) 
   
Party ID Strength 0.05 0.07
*
 
 (0.04) (0.03) 
   
Female 0.02 0.01 
 (0.02) (0.02) 
   
Age 0.02 0.11
**
 
 (0.04) (0.04) 
   
Constant 0.56
***
 0.34
***
 
 (0.07) (0.06) 
N 616 615 
adj. R
2
 0.28 0.20 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*
 p < 0.05, 
**
 p < 0.01, 
***
 p < 0.001, two tailed. 
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Experimental Manipulations 
 
Turnout Only (Control) 
 
As Midterm Elections Approach, Campaigns Say It 
Is All About Turnout 
 
   
  
Campaigns, independent expenditures and Super PACs will spend 
millions of dollars this fall trying to persuade voters around the country to 
choose their candidate over all others. However, strong evidence now 
suggests the biggest determinant of who will win is not the candidate 
with the best message, but the candidate who can most effectively turn 
out his or her base. 
  
Midterms are all about base mobilization of partisan voters, not changing 
minds. In fact, one recent study by political scientists at UCLA found that 
only 6% of voters changed parties between 2010 and 2012. However, 
14% of voters in 2010 simply failed to show up to vote in 2012. This 
finding has led some to suggest that investing in persuasion is an 
enormous waste of money. 
  
Several campaigns are changing tactics as a result of this new realization 
about the central role turnout plays in electoral results. Jim Stetson, a 
Washington D.C. political consultant, puts it this way: “If we are not 
going to be able to change your mind with an attack advertisement, 
colorful yard sign, or witty campaign slogan, we should focus our 
resources instead on getting our voters out to the polls.” Of course, that is 
perhaps more easily said than done. 
  
When Election Day rolls around, though, it is likely the party that has 
figured it out will reap the spoils. 
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Voter ID Condition 
 
As Midterm Elections Approach, Campaigns Say 
Turnout and Voter ID Laws Will Matter 
 
 
   
 
Campaigns, independent expenditures and Super PACs will spend 
millions of dollars this fall trying to persuade voters around the country to 
choose their candidate over all others. However, strong evidence now 
suggests the biggest determinant of who will win is not the candidate 
with the best message, but the candidate who can most effectively turn 
out his or her base. 
  
Midterms are all about base mobilization of partisan voters, not changing 
minds. In fact, one recent study by political scientists at UCLA found that 
only 6% of voters changed parties between 2010 and 2012. However, 
14% of voters in 2010 simply failed to show up to vote in 2012. This 
finding has led some to suggest that investing in persuasion is an 
enormous waste of money. 
  
Also on the horizon are new laws that determine who is eligible to vote. 
Many states around the nation have passed “Voter ID Laws” designed to 
increase the documentation necessary to receive a ballot at a polling 
place. Jim Stetson, a Washington D.C. political consultant, suggests these 
laws will make a difference: “People will need to make sure they know 
the rules about who can vote in their state, and what kind of 
documentation is needed in order to receive a ballot.” 
  
When Election Day rolls around, the party that understands turnout and 
the new voting rules out will reap the spoils. 
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Voter Disenfranchisement Condition 
 
As Midterm Elections Approach, Campaigns Say Voter 
ID Laws Will Block Thousands of Legal Voters 
 
   
  
Campaigns, independent expenditures and Super PACs will spend 
millions of dollars this fall trying to persuade voters around the country to 
choose their candidate over all others. However, strong evidence now 
suggests the biggest determinant of who will win is not the candidate 
with the best message, but the candidate who can effectively turn out his 
or her base. 
  
Midterms are all about base mobilization of partisan voters, not changing 
minds. In fact, one recent study by political scientists at UCLA found that 
only 6% of voters changed parties between 2010 and 2012. However, 
14% of voters in 2010 simply failed to show up to vote in 2012. This 
finding has led some to suggest that investing in persuasion is an 
enormous waste of money. 
  
That is also why most campaigns are focusing on how to navigate new 
laws that determine who is eligible to vote. Many states around the nation 
have passed “Voter ID Laws” designed to increase the proof necessary to 
receive a ballot at a polling place. Studies have shown that these laws 
prevent many legally eligible citizens from casting their ballot. Jim 
Stetson, a Washington D.C. political consultant, suggests these laws will 
make a difference: “Our research has shown that, on average, these laws 
will prevent thousands of legal voters from exercising their right to vote 
on Election Day. It is an absolute outrage.” 
  
When Election Day rolls around, the party that understands turnout and 
the new voting rules will reap the spoils. 
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Black Disenfranchisement Condition 
 
As Midterm Elections Approach, Campaigns Say Voter 
ID Laws Will Block Thousands of Black Voters 
 
   
  
Campaigns, independent expenditures and Super PACs will spend 
millions of dollars this fall trying to persuade voters around the country to 
choose their candidate over all others. However, strong evidence now 
suggests the biggest determinant of who will win is not the candidate 
with the best message, but the candidate who can effectively turn out his 
or her base. 
  
Midterms are all about base mobilization of partisan voters, not changing 
minds. In fact, one recent study by political scientists at UCLA found that 
only 6% of voters changed parties between 2010 and 2012. However, 
14% of voters in 2010 simply failed to show up to vote in 2012. This 
finding has led some to suggest that investing in persuasion is an 
enormous waste of money. 
  
That is also why most campaigns are focusing on how to navigate new 
laws that determine who is eligible to vote. Many states around the nation 
have passed “Voter ID Laws” designed to increase the proof necessary to 
receive a ballot at a polling place. Studies have shown that these laws 
prevent many legally eligible Black citizens from casting their ballot. Jim 
Stetson, a Washington D.C. political consultant, suggests these laws will 
make a difference: “Our research has shown that, on average, these laws 
will prevent thousands of legal African American voters from exercising 
their right to vote on Election Day. It is an absolute outrage.” 
  
When Election Day rolls around, the party that understands turnout and 
the new voting rules will reap the spoils. 
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Voter Fraud Condition 
 
As Midterm Elections Approach, Campaigns Say Voter 
ID Laws Will Block Thousands of Illegal Voters 
 
   
  
Campaigns, independent expenditures and Super PACs will spend 
millions of dollars this fall trying to persuade voters around the country to 
choose their candidate over all others. However, strong evidence now 
suggests the biggest determinant of who will win is not the candidate 
with the best message, but the candidate who can most effectively turn 
out his or her base. 
  
Midterms are all about base mobilization of partisan voters, not changing 
minds. In fact, one recent study by political scientists at UCLA found that 
only 6% of voters changed parties between 2010 and 2012. However, 
14% of voters in 2010 simply failed to show up to vote in 2012. This 
finding has led some to suggest that investing in persuasion is an 
enormous waste of money. 
  
That is also why most campaigns are focusing on how to obey new laws 
designed to keep ineligible voters from casting votes. Many states around 
the nation have passed “Voter ID Laws” which increase the 
documentation necessary to receive a ballot at a polling place. Some 
studies have shown that these laws substantially reduce voter fraud. Jim 
Stetson, a Washington D.C. political consultant, suggests these laws will 
make a difference: “Our research has shown that, on average, these laws 
will prevent thousands of illegal voters from casting a ballot on Election 
Day. We simply cannot risk having voting fraud contaminate our 
elections. That would be an absolute outrage.” 
  
When Election Day rolls around, the party that understands turnout and 
the new voting rules will reap the spoils. 
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Testing Alternative Mediators  
 
Table A2: Changing Perceptions of the Problem of Voter Fraud 
 Mean Std. Error 95% CI Low 95% CI High 
Control .46 .02 .41 .51 
Voter ID .44 .03 .39 .49 
Voter 
Disenfranchisement 
.46 .03 .41 .51 
Black 
Disenfranchisement 
.48 .03 .43 .52 
Voter Fraud .47 .03 .42 .52 
Note: T-tests reveal no significant differences between conditions 
 
Table A3: Polarization of Attitudes on Voter ID Laws  
 Mean Std. Error 95% CI Low 95% CI High 
Control .60 .03 .54 .66 
Voter ID .63 .03 .57 .69 
Voter 
Disenfranchisement 
.60 .03 .54 .66 
Black 
Disenfranchisement 
.63 .03 .57 .69 
Voter Fraud .60 .03 .54 .66 
Note: T-tests reveal no significant differences between conditions 
 
Table A4: Hopefulness as a Mediator 
 Mean Std. Error 95% CI Low 95% CI High 
Control .19 .02 .15 .22 
Voter ID .18 .02 .14 .22 
Voter 
Disenfranchisement 
.12 .02 .08 .16 
Black 
Disenfranchisement 
.12 .02 .08 .16 
Voter Fraud .17 .02 .13 .21 
Note: Here T-tests reveal significant decreases in hopefulness between the control and 
the Voter Disenfranchisement condition (p<0.05) and between the control and the 
Black Disenfranchisement condition (p<0.05). However, there are no significant 
mediation effects. 
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Question Wordings 
 
Study 1:  
 
Anger questions:  
 
If someone attempted to cast a vote who was not legally eligible to do so, how angry 
would that make you feel? (Response options: Extremely Angry – Very Angry – 
Somewhat Angry – Not too Angry – Not at all Angry) 
 
Various states have proposed voter id laws that require all citizens to show a form of 
government-issued identification when they vote.  If such a law actually prevented 
some qualified voters from casting a ballot, how angry would that make you feel? 
(Response options: Extremely Angry – Very Angry – Somewhat Angry – Not too 
Angry – Not at all Angry) 
 
Voter ID Opinion Question:  
 
Do you favor or oppose state and federal governments passing stricter election laws 
requiring identification for an individual to obtain a ballot, even if that makes it 
difficult for some citizens to vote? (Response options: Strongly favor – Somewhat 
favor – Neither favor nor oppose – Somewhat oppose – Strongly oppose) 
 
Participation questions: 
 
How likely would you be to volunteer some of your time in the next election to raise 
awareness about voter ID laws so that people know what they need to do in order to 
be able to vote? (Response options: Extremely interested – Very interested – 
Somewhat interested – Not too interested – Not at all interested)  
 
Even though the 2014 Congressional Elections are months and months away, and 
there are many things that can get in the way of voting, how likely are you to vote in 
that election? (Response options: Extremely likely – Very likely – Somewhat likely – 
Not too likely – Not at all likely) 
 
Symbolic Racism:  
 
The Irish, Italians, Jews and many other minorities overcame prejudice and worked 
their way up. Blacks should do the same without any special favors. (Response 
options: Agree Strongly – Agree Somewhat – Neither Agree nor disagree – Disagree 
somewhat – Disagree strongly)  
 
Generations of slavery and discrimination have created conditions that make it 
difficult for blacks to work their way out of the lower class. (Response options: Agree 
Strongly – Agree Somewhat – Neither Agree nor disagree – Disagree somewhat – 
Disagree strongly) 
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It is really a matter of not trying hard enough; if blacks would only try harder they 
could be just as well off as whites. (Response options: Agree Strongly – Agree 
Somewhat – Neither Agree nor disagree – Disagree somewhat – Disagree strongly) 
 
Over the past few years, blacks have gotten less than they deserve. (Response options: 
Agree Strongly – Agree Somewhat – Neither Agree nor disagree – Disagree 
som what – Disagree strongly) 
 
 
 
Study 2: 
 
Emotion questions:  
 
Generally speaking, how did the story you read make you feel? Please tell us how 
much you felt each of the following emotions while reading the story. Did you feel 
each emotion extremely, very much, somewhat, a little, or not at all?  
Emotions used in anger index: angry, outraged, disgusted, annoyed 
 
Participation questions: 
 
In talking to people about elections, we often find that a lot of people are not able to 
vote because they aren't registered, they are sick, they don't have time, or something 
else happens to prevent them from voting. Please think carefully about all the things 
that come up that might prevent you from turning out to vote. So how likely is it that 
you will vote in the general election this coming November 4th, 2014? (Response 
options: Extremely likely – Very likely – Somewhat likely – Not too likely – Not at 
all likely) 
 
 
How interested are you in volunteering some of your time to raise awareness of voter 
identification laws so that people know what they need to do in order to be able to 
vote? (Response options: Extremely interested – Very interested – Somewhat 
interested – Not too interested – Not at all interested) 
 
How likely is it that you will go to any political meetings, rallies, speeches, dinners, 
or things like that in support of a particular candidate during this year's election 
campaign? (Response options: Extremely likely – Very likely – Somewhat likely – 
Not too likely – Not at all likely) 
 
What is the maximum amount of money you think you might donate to political 
parties or candidates in this year's election? (Response options: enter dollar amount) 
 
How likely is it that you will give money to any individual candidate running for 
public office in this year's election? (Response options: Extremely likely – Very likely 
– Somewhat likely – Not too likely – Not at all likely) 
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